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INTRODUCTION 
“The Recent Unpleasantness” is one of several Southern euphemisms for the 
American Civil War.1 It is also a fitting description of our current political 
predicament. Of course, I am not suggesting that the United States is currently in 
the middle of a civil war, or that we will soon be in a civil war. Rather, the 
expression conveys a widespread feeling that something has gone seriously wrong 
with constitutional democracy in the United States. The stark political and cultural 
polarization of American life, the raucous 2016 election, and the tabloid 
meanderings of the Trump Presidency have only seemed to confirm a growing 
despair about the future of democracy in America. 
This Article, however, takes a longer view, and argues that the malaise is only 
temporary. I will use tools from constitutional theory and from political science to 
try to explain what is happening to American politics. But first, let me offer a little 
astronomical diversion. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 *. Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. 
This Article is based on the Addison C. Harris Lecture that I gave at Indiana University on 
September 13, 2017. My thanks to Dawn Johnsen and the members of the Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law faculty for the invitation and for their gracious hospitality. 
 1. These include “the War Between the States” and “the War of Northern Aggression.” 
ELAINE MARIE ALPHIN, AN UNSPEAKABLE CRIME: THE PROSECUTION AND PERSECUTION OF 
LEO FRANK 23 (2010) (listing multiple Southern euphemisms for the Civil War). 
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I. THINKING IN TERMS OF CYCLES 
On August 21, 2017, an amazing event occurred over large parts of the United 
States: a total eclipse of the sun.2 These are very rare occurrences, especially this 
one, which moved across almost the entire breadth of the United States.3 In early 
times, eclipses were frightening events. They came suddenly; people feared that 
magical powers were at work and that the sun would never return. We don’t fear 
eclipses today, of course, because we know that they are natural phenomena caused 
by the concatenation of different cycles. The sun and moon, when viewed from the 
earth, are just about the same size, depending on the earth’s orbit around the sun, 
and the moon’s orbit around the earth. And so, when the earth is at a particular 
position in its cycle around the sun, and the moon is in a particular position in its 
cycle around the earth, and the three line up in just the right way, the disc of the 
moon covers the disc of the sun for a brief period of time.4 It is an amazing 
spectacle, and some people have called it a life-altering event. Stunning as these 
events are, we know that they will soon be over. 
Our present condition is a little like an eclipse, although much less enjoyable. To 
understand what is going on today in America, we have to think in terms of 
political cycles that interact with each other and create remarkable—and dark 
—times. 
In American constitutional law, however, people tend not to think in terms of 
cycles. Rather, they think about time in linear terms. The two most well-known 
approaches to constitutional interpretation in the United States involve linear 
visions of time. One is originalism, and the other is living constitutionalism.  
Originalism is linear because it rests on an implicit story—about how we have 
moved further and further away from the moment in time that grounds the authority 
of the Constitution and the correct meaning of the Constitution. To interpret the 
Constitution correctly, we must restore the meaning at a moment that has long 
since passed.5 We must return to that moment, metaphorically speaking. We must 
restore the correct interpretation and not stray from it again. The problem of 
interpretation arises precisely from the fact that time is linear: that we move ever 
further away from the moment that grants authority. 
Originalism can also be a story of decay—a concern with what we have lost and 
about the need for restoration and renewal. As we move further and further away in 
time from the source of constitutional meaning and authority, we make mistake 
after mistake in our interpretations of the Constitution. Judges in particular are 
tempted to stray from the original meaning and impose their personal predilections. 
So we must find a way to retrace our steps and return to the original meaning that is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. NASA, Total Solar Eclipse August 21, 2017, TOTAL ECLIPSE, https://eclipse2017 
.nasa.gov [https://perma.cc/LBP4-EQLW]. 
 3. Id.  
 4. NASA, How Eclipses Work, TOTAL ECLIPSE, https://eclipse2017.nasa.gov/how 
-eclipses-work [https://perma.cc/8CPW-XGLH]. 
 5. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 459 (2013) (“[A]ll of [the] members of the originalist family agree on 
a core idea—meaning is fixed at the time of origin.”).  
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the source of constitutional authority. That is the only way to restore and ground 
our constitutional system. 
The other standard theory of constitutional interpretation is called living 
constitutionalism. This is the idea that as history progresses, so too should our 
Constitution.6 In every day, in every way, our Constitution is becoming a better 
constitution—or at least, we should interpret the Constitution to make it so. Living 
constitutionalism also has a linear theory of time, because it rests on an implicit 
story of progress. We no longer live in the time of the Founders. We have left them 
behind. We honor the Founders’ achievements in their time, but they are long dead. 
Their views may have been good enough for their day (or maybe not—after all, 
they owned slaves!). But their opinions may well be inadequate for our very 
different times and circumstances. Most living constitutionalists assume that if we 
adapt the Constitution to changing circumstances, this will represent improvement 
rather than decline, and gradual progress rather than gradual unraveling.7 In other 
words, the theory implicitly rejects the idea that moving away from the past and 
forward in time signifies decay or loss. The arc of history is long, but it bends 
towards justice. If we keep the Constitution in touch with the times, it will not only 
function better, but it will approach justice as well.  
These views are obviously opposed to each other, and yet it’s worth noting what 
they have in common. They are linear conceptions of time. We move away from 
the past, for good or for ill.  
But that is not the only way to think about historical change. If you asked the 
Ancient Greeks or the Ancient Chinese, they would have disagreed. They would 
have argued that history moves in cycles, not in straight lines away from the past.8 
In order to have a cyclic view of history, you don’t have to believe that things occur 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 277 (2011) (explaining that living 
constitutionalism is “the claim that the Constitution adapts—and should adapt—to changing 
times and conditions, and reflect the evolving values of the American people”). 
 7. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“[T]he words of the [Eighth] 
Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”). 
 8. W. K. C. GUTHRIE, IN THE BEGINNING 63 (1957) (“[T]he Greek mind was especially 
attracted [to] the idea that as in space, so in time, the cosmic movement was circular. 
Everything returns to what it was before, and what has been will be again.”); ENDYMION 
WILKINSON, CHINESE HISTORY: A MANUAL 513 (rev. & enlarged ed. 2000) (describing the 
five-phase theory of cycles of Chinese history). The great Chinese Classic of Changes, or I 
Ching, is structured as a cycle of situations through which time and events flow. See JACK M. 
BALKIN, THE LAWS OF CHANGE: I CHING AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE (2009). 
The Greek historian Polybius offered the most famous version of cycles in politics, 
arguing that regimes cycled among monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, with each form 
deteriorating and leading to the next. 3 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES bk. VI, at 299–315 (W.R. 
Patton, F.W. Walbank & Christian Habicht trans., Loeb Classical Library ed. 2011). 
Polybius’s concept of cycles and the inevitable corruption of forms of government 
influenced Italian Renaissance thinkers such as Machiavelli and eventually, through multiple 
transformations, the Founding generation in the United States. See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC 
REPUBLICAN TRADITION 77, 189, 401, 526, 539, 545, 548 (2d ed. 2003). 
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exactly in the same way they occurred before. Rather, you can take the view, often 
attributed to Mark Twain, that history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.9 
That is the general approach I will develop in this Article. I invite you to think 
of the events that we are going through like the strains of a ballad that repeatedly 
returns to its refrain, although with many changes and variations along the way.  
But of course, things are not quite as simple as that. What is especially 
interesting about our current situation is that there is more than one cycle at work. 
In fact, there are three. And when these three cycles converge, when they all line up 
in a certain way, the result is a sort of political eclipse of the sun, a very dark and 
disturbing time. What one gets, in other words, is the recent unpleasantness.  
Of course, the cycles that I will discuss here are quite different from the cycles 
that cause the eclipse of the sun. They arise through the interaction of political will 
with institutional structures. People cause these cycles through mobilization, 
organization, and the exercise of political will in a particular institutional 
environment. The institutions shape the actions, while the effects of the actions 
slowly remake the institutions. 
In this Article, I will talk about what I expect is going to happen in the next five 
to ten years. Unlike eclipses, however, one can’t be entirely sure of the future. 
Politics is not astronomy, and human affairs do not operate like clockwork. 
Moreover, we can’t assume that everything is already foreordained: that if people 
simply sit on their hands and do nothing, the cycles I describe in this lecture will 
take care of themselves. Quite the contrary. I am telling a story about what happens 
in the long run, but it is not a deterministic story. The actions of many individuals 
over time, pursuing their values and interests, but constrained by institutional 
arrangements, will tend to cycle in intelligible ways. But people have to actually 
pursue those interests. They have to be motivated to respond to the problems they 
face. Above all, they can’t allow themselves to be overcome by despair and 
paralyzed into inaction. 
Of course some people do despair today. They fear that we are headed 
inexorably toward fascism, authoritarianism, and the end of democracy. That is not 
what I think is going to happen. Nor do I expect that the American public will sit 
on its hands. I believe that Americans will respond to the misfortunes of our present 
age, just as they have many times before. And for that reason, although I will 
mention our current President at various points in my discussion, I will not be 
delving into great detail about the crazy and often disturbing things that have 
happened since his election. Instead, I will view him, and the party he leads, as 
exhibiting the effects of the cycles of constitutional time on political life in 
America.  
My purpose, then, is not to tell people that their democracy will take care of 
itself without any effort on their part. Rather, it is to offer a bit of hope for people 
who read the news every day and fear that things are only going to get worse. Hope 
does not guarantee action, but it makes beneficial action more likely. If people 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. It is not clear that Twain ever actually said this. The closest example comes from 2 
MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE 178 (Harper & Brothers 1915) 
(1873) (“History never repeats itself, but the kaleidoscopic combinations of the pictured 
present often seem to be constructed out of the broken fragments of antique legends.”). 
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misunderstand our situation, and conclude that American decline is inevitable, they 
may unwittingly help to make that fate a reality; but if they understand the cycles of 
constitutional time, they may come to believe that their democracy can be 
redeemed, and do their part to realize that worthy goal. 
What are the three cycles at work in American politics? The first is the cycle of 
the rise and fall of political regimes in American history. The second is the cycle of 
polarization and depolarization. And the third is the decay and renewal of 
republican government, which I call the cycle of constitutional rot and 
constitutional renewal. Each of these cycles operates on a different time scale. I 
will introduce each of them in turn, and explain how they interact. Together, the 
interaction of these three cycles—of the rise and fall of regimes, of polarization and 
depolarization, and of rot and renewal—generate constitutional time.10 Think of the 
analysis that follows like a chronometer that tells you where we are in 
constitutional time. 
Before I describe these cycles in detail, however, it might be helpful to offer 
four central points that will frame my argument. First, we are not in a constitutional 
crisis. Second, we are suffering from a severe case of constitutional rot. Third, we 
are at (what one can only hope is) peak polarization, and this polarization is 
connected to constitutional rot. Fourth, and perhaps most important, our recent 
unpleasantness is only a temporary condition. We are in transition, a very difficult, 
agonizing, and humbling transition, but a transition nevertheless.  
When I say that it is a temporary condition, however, I do not mean that things 
will go back to the way they were before the 2016 election. They will not; they 
cannot. We are in transition to a new constitutional order, with a new party 
structure, and with many new and unfamiliar elements.11 The recent unpleasantness 
is the awkward, uncomfortable, and occasionally frightening transition to that new 
political order.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. The expression “constitutional time” is not original with me, but I use it in a specific 
way—to describe the interaction of multiple cycles of change that affect the fortunes of a 
constitutional democracy. For a different usage, see Richard Alexander Izquierdo, The 
Architecture of Constitutional Time, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1089, 1091 (2015) (defining 
“constitutional time” as “the extraordinary historical events that destabilize the regime and 
open space for new interpretations and constructions to change or supplement constitutional 
meaning”). Both Izquierdo and I adapt the term from Stephen Skowronek’s concept of political 
time, discussed in Part II. Skowronek’s political time concerns one of the constituent cycles of 
constitutional time: the rise and fall of political regimes. See infra Section II.A. 
 11. Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System is 
Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1160–61 (2014) (arguing that the United States is in a 
long and difficult transition between political regimes); cf. Richard Primus, The Republic in 
Long-Term Perspective, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3 (Aug. 2018), http://Michigan 
lawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/117MichLRevOnline1_Primus.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3EN7-BZA4] (“[T]he conditions that made the twentieth-century system [of 
democracy in the United States] possible are gone, and they aren’t coming back.”). 
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II. THE CYCLE OF REGIMES 
Our current political problems stem from the fact that we are in the final days of 
a crumbling, decadent political regime, and no new regime has yet appeared to take 
its place. This is a difficult and agonizing transition, a very sad time in American 
life. Its difficulty is enhanced by the fact that this transition between political 
regimes occurs at a time of peak polarization12—the crest of the cycle of 
polarization and depolarization—and at the low point of a cycle of constitutional 
rot.13 For that reason, the transition to a new political regime is going to be very 
difficult. But we will get through it. And when we get through it—about five to ten 
years from now—the present will seem like a distant, unhappy nightmare, or an 
illness from which one has recovered. Our politics will be quite different. 
Many people my age or older have lived through another transition between 
political regimes, although they may not remember it as such. The last transition 
was not half as wrenching as this one. It occurred in the last years of the 1970s 
though the first years of the 1980s.14 In a lecture I gave five years ago, I referred to 
it as “The Last Days of Disco.”15 This was the transition from the final years of the 
New Deal/Civil Rights regime, when Jimmy Carter was President, to the current 
regime we are living in now, the regime begun by Ronald Reagan, which I will call 
the Reagan regime.16  
The transition from the New Deal/Civil Rights regime to the Reagan regime did 
not occur in circumstances as fraught as ours. First, it was not a time of strong 
polarization.17 Polarization had been growing slowly since the 1960s, but it really 
took off during the Reagan regime, for reasons I will describe.18 In fact, one of the 
characteristic features of the Reagan regime is the development of political parties 
with strong polarization and conflict extension.19 Polarization means that people in 
the two parties disagree strongly on particular issues. But they might still agree  
on some things, or there might be policy disagreements that cross party lines. 
Conflict extension means that Democrats and Republicans have simultaneously 
become polarized on multiple policy dimensions and multiple policy issues, even 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Lee Drutman, American Politics Has Reached Peak Polarization, VOX (Mar. 24, 
2016, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/3/24/11298808/american-politics-
peak-polarization [https://perma.cc/RDL4-XM9B]; see also Jeff Lewis, Polarization in 
Congress, VOTEVIEW.COM (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.voteview.com/articles/party 
_polarization [https://perma.cc/5VZB-DUJA] (graph of “Liberal-conservative partisan 
polarization by chamber”). Focusing on partisan distance between the two major parties in 
Congress, Lewis notes strong polarization in the 1880s and 1890s followed by a steep 
decline bottoming out in the 1930s and significant increases following 1984, leading to a 
new peak, even more severe than the 1890s, in the present. See Lewis, supra. 
 13. I discuss constitutional rot in Part V, infra. 
 14. Balkin, supra note 11, at 1159. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Lewis, supra note 12 (showing that in the late 1970s, polarization was still 
modest). 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 65–71. 
 19. See Geoffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Polarization and “Conflict 
Extension” in the American Electorate, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 786, 789 (2002). 
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issues that ostensibly have little to do with each other, so that all of the 
disagreements line up.20 
Just as the change of regimes in the late 1970s did not occur during a period of 
strong polarization and conflict extension, it also did not occur during a period of 
advanced constitutional rot. The rot mostly came later. As I will also describe, a 
characteristic feature of the Reagan regime is a series of policy decisions that 
significantly increased economic inequality, and this, together with increasing party 
polarization, made the political system especially susceptible to constitutional rot. 
To explain these ideas in more detail, I will begin with the central idea of 
constitutional regimes and explain the life cycle of these regimes. To do this, I will 
draw on the work of a distinguished political scientist and scholar of the 
presidency, Stephen Skowronek, at Yale University. He developed a theory of 
Presidential leadership within political regimes that has been very influential, and 
deservedly so.21 
Here is the big idea: American political history is a series of successive 
governing regimes in which political parties compete.22 Within each regime one of 
the political parties tends to dominate.23 That doesn’t mean that the party wins all 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN 
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON (1997) [hereinafter SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE]; 
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE AND 
REAPPRAISAL 135–36 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN 
POLITICAL TIME].  
 22. See KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 61 (2004); Andrew J. Polsky, Partisan Regimes in American Politics, 44 
POLITY 51, 52–53 (2012). The idea of political regimes emerged from earlier political 
science models that focused on electoral realignments and critical elections, but scholars 
have shown that these earlier approaches have serious shortcomings. See, e.g., DAVID R. 
MAYHEW, ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF AN AMERICAN GENRE (2002). As a 
result, regime theories no longer rest on a particular theory of realigning elections. See 
Polsky, supra, at 56–57.  
One can define regimes in terms of successful parties that successfully manage to set the 
terms of political debate for extended periods of time, no matter how electoral alignments 
change underneath them. For example, although electoral patterns changed greatly between 
1860 and 1932, the Republican Party remained the dominant political party in the United 
States. Along these lines, Polsky defines a partisan regime as “a political coalition organized 
under a common party label that challenges core tenets of the established political order, 
secures effective national governing power, defines broadly the terms of political debate, and 
maintains sufficient power to thwart opposition efforts to undo its principal policy, 
institutional, and ideological achievements.” Id. at 57.  
In the alternative, one can define a regime in terms of how it replaces older government 
arrangements with new and lasting ones. The New Deal’s reconstruction of American 
governance is a good example. See, e.g., Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Regimes and 
Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s, 113 POL. 
SCI. Q. 689, 693 (1998–99) (describing regime building as “a form of elite engineering . . . 
[that] stabilize[s] . . . governmental operations around a new set of political assumptions”). 
 23. Polsky, supra note 22, at 52 (“[N]ewly dominant parties propel bursts of broad 
political change and then preside over longer interludes of relative stability.”); see also 
SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 35 (noting that Presidents 
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of the elections. But it does win most of the elections, and the party’s ideals and 
interests construct the basic agenda for politics during the regime.24 Put another 
way, the dominant party sets the baseline of what is considered possible and 
impossible politically. It structures the basic ideological assumptions of politics of 
its time. To give only one example: the current regime—the Reagan regime—has 
been shaped by the agendas of American conservatism and neoliberal ideology. Its 
vision of politics is very different than the ideological assumptions of the previous 
constitutional order—the New Deal/Civil Rights regime, a period that featured 
expansion of government regulation and social insurance programs, powerful labor 
unions, and the civil rights and civil liberties revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s.25  
A political coalition supports the dominant party. That coalition brings it into 
ascendance and keeps it in power. Eventually the coalition changes and fractures as 
a result of changing circumstances. These include demographic changes—the 
succession of generations and waves of immigration—economic changes, cultural 
changes, technological changes, and so on. 
Moreover, successful coalitions are often the victims of their own success.26 As 
they achieve policy victories, they change the political world around them. They 
create institutional impediments that make further change difficult. Their 
opposition regroups in new and more effective ways. Elements of the dominant 
party divide into factions and some become radicalized and demanding. 
Compromise becomes more difficult. Parts of the coalition become impatient and 
feel increasingly slighted or marginalized; they demand that the coalition take care 
of their needs. The dominant party’s familiar approaches to politics—its agendas 
and its habitual solutions to policy problems—increasingly seem out of touch and 
irrelevant to the problems of the present. The coalition shrinks and fragments. It 
becomes weak and debilitated, and this creates an opening—not always 
successfully taken—for a different party to begin a new regime. The new party is 
supported by a new political coalition, and it promotes a different set of 
commitments of ideology and interest. 
What I have just described is the life cycle of a political regime in American 
politics. A party that was once subordinate gradually grows in strength. It forms a 
rising coalition. It dominates politics. It promotes its distinctive agendas of 
ideology and interest. Its influence peaks. It becomes the victim of its own success. 
Its factions struggle with each other. It weakens, it withers, and it is eventually 
pushed aside by a new regime headed by another political party. 
  
                                                                                                                 
are either allied with the dominant party or form part of the opposition); Jack Balkin, Obama 
Hoped to Be a Transformational President. He Failed., VOX (Jan. 19, 2017), https:// 
www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/19/14323552/obama-legacy-reagan-clinton-conservative 
-liberal [https://perma.cc/Z2Z2-5MQ8]. 
 24. See supra note 22.  
 25. See Balkin, supra note 11. 
 26. Id. at 1170–71. 
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Table 1: The Cycle of Regimes in American Constitutional History 
Name Years Dominant 
Party 
Opposition Party 
Federalist 1789–1800 Federalists Jeffersonians 
Jeffersonian 1800–1828 Democratic-
Republicans 
Federalists (until mid-
1810s) 
Jacksonian 1828–1860 Democrats National Republicans; 
Whigs (after 1834); 
Republicans (after 1854) 
Republican 1860–1932 Republicans Democrats 
New Deal/Civil 
Rights 
1932–1980 Democrats Republicans 
Reagan (Second 
Republican) 
1980–? Republicans Democrats 
 
As Table 1 indicates, this cycle has happened about six times in American 
history.27 The first regime is led by the revolutionary party, the Federalist Party, 
which loses power in 1800 and eventually falls apart. The next regime is the 
Jeffersonian regime, which begins with Thomas Jefferson’s election in 1800. It is 
so dominant that for a brief time the United States effectively has one-party rule. 
This is sometimes known as the “era of good feelings.” But that expression 
disguises a growing set of disagreements and factions. The good feelings don’t last, 
and the Jeffersonian regime begins to fall apart in 1824, with a contested election 
that is thrown into the House of Representatives. The Jeffersonian regime is 
succeeded by the Jacksonian regime, beginning with Andrew Jackson’s election in 
1828. This regime is led by the Democratic Party, the first mass political party, the 
party of the white working man, and also the party of slavery. Eventually it 
becomes the vehicle and the mouthpiece for the Slave Power. 
The Jacksonian regime falls apart because of increasing factionalism and 
radicalism among defenders of slavery, who try to preserve and extend their 
political power as the country develops into its western territories. This leads to the 
original “recent unpleasantness”—the American Civil War. Political struggles over 
the growth of slavery destroy the old Jacksonian coalition—as well as the coalition 
of the opposition party, the Whigs—and create an opening for a new regime, led by 
the ascendant Republican Party, created in 1854. 
The Republican Party is the party of the Union, and following the Civil War, it 
dominates American politics for a very long time; for this reason it well deserves 
its nickname of the Grand Old Party or GOP. The first Republican regime is the 
longest-lived regime in American history. It lasts from 1860 until 1932. The 
Republican regime weakens, however, with the increasing corruption of the Gilded 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See ORREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 22, at 61; Polsky, supra note 22, at 52. Some 
scholars treat the realigning election of 1896 as the beginning of a new Republican regime, 
while others, like Skowronek, do not. See SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, 
supra note 21, at 230–33 (arguing that Theodore Roosevelt was still working within the 
Republican regime created in 1860). 
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Age. The Democrats—the party of the old South, slavery, and secession 
—eventually grow stronger. They retake the House in 1874 and finally return to the 
presidency in 1884, almost twenty years after the conclusion of the Civil War. The 
Democrats have a chance to start a new regime in the 1896 election, allied with the 
insurgent populists. But for complicated reasons, the Democrats blow their chance, 
the Republicans regroup under William McKinley, and the Republican regime is 
revived and continues until the New Deal. 
The Republican regime, however, is finally done in by the Great Depression. It 
is succeeded by the New Deal/Civil Rights regime, which begins with Franklin 
Roosevelt’s election in 1932. The Democrats, with a new coalition that includes 
Catholic immigrants, city dwellers, and labor unions, become the dominant party. 
In contrast to the Civil War era, national politics is quite depolarized, and most 
political achievements result from a series of bargains between three coalitions: 
Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans. This is the regime that 
creates the modern state and eventually passes the great civil rights acts.  
The New Deal/Civil Rights regime is the victim of its own success. The 
Democratic Party begins to split apart during the 1960s—in part because of 
disputes over race and the Vietnam War—and members of its Southern wing start 
to leave the party. What we now call the culture wars begin. The 1970s witness the 
emergence of the New Right and a collection of conservative social movements; 
they will eventually remake the Republican Party in their own image. 
The New Deal/Civil Rights regime is on its last legs in the 1970s, buffeted about 
by internal dissention and economic stagnation. The collapse of the New Deal/Civil 
Rights regime creates the opening for the emergence of the Reagan regime, which 
begins with Reagan’s election in 1980. The conservative movement gradually takes 
over the Republican Party, revives it, and pushes it decidedly to the right. The 
Republican Party becomes the dominant national party, and it sets the agenda for 
national politics for decades. This is the regime of neoliberalism, deregulation, 
declining labor unions, and lower taxes—especially for the wealthy. 
This is the regime we have been living under through most of my adult life. And 
this is the regime that is cracking up before our eyes. For the better part of a 
decade, the Republican Party has been radicalized and factionalized; it has been 
undergoing either a civil war or a nervous breakdown.28 Polarization and mutual 
distrust between the parties has become endemic. The party has been taken over by 
populist demagogues and con artists, of whom Donald Trump is only the most 
recent example. The party is momentarily united under Trump’s brand of populist 
nativism. Even so, the party looks ripe for an electoral reckoning, if not in 2020, 
then in the next few election cycles. 
Of course, one could have said the same thing in 2008, but it didn’t happen. 
Barack Obama and an emerging coalition of women, minorities, suburbanites, and 
professionals—the “coalition of the ascendant”29—were not able to inaugurate a 
new political regime. After two terms of Obama’s presidency, the rising coalition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. Balkin, supra note 11, at 1170. 
 29. Ronald Brownstein, The Hidden History of the American Electorate (II), NAT’L J. 
(Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.yahoo.com/news/hidden-history-american-electorate-ii 
-175214333.html [https://perma.cc/M5JN-YMCP] (describing Obama’s “coalition of the 
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was not yet strong enough to elect Hillary Clinton in 2016.30 Even so, the Reagan 
regime is far weaker and internally conflicted than it was in 2008. The old regime 
is dying, but a new regime has yet to be born. 
Why do I say that this regime is dying? For those who follow American politics, 
that statement might seem quite strange. In an important sense, the Republican 
Party is stronger now than it has been for almost a century.31 Following Trump’s 
2016 victory, commentators pointed out that the Republicans haven’t dominated 
national politics this much since 1928, when the party controlled all of the branches 
of government.32 Nineteen twenty-eight . . . . Gee, I wonder what happened after 
that . . . . 
After the election of Donald Trump in 2016, the Republican Party controlled the 
Presidency and both houses of Congress. It had a Supreme Court majority, 
controlled more than half of the governorships, and had unified control of the 
legislature in thirty-three states.33 (Some of this, of course, may change following 
the mid-term elections in 2018). On paper, at least, The Republican Party appears 
to be a strong and robust political party, especially at the state and local level. 
At the national level, however, the regime has many weaknesses, some overt 
and some hidden. 
First, the Reagan regime, like many previous regimes, is a victim of its own 
success. At the outset its central commitments of ideology and interest were to 
lower taxes, make government smaller, reduce business regulation, build up 
national defense, and defeat communism. The Soviet Union was gone by 1991. The 
War on Terror offered a replacement for Cold War politics, but it led to the policy 
disaster of the Iraq War. As time goes on, calls for lowering taxes, reducing 
regulations, and building up defense seem increasingly irrelevant to problems the 
country faces in the 2010s—stagnant wages, decreasing social mobility, an opioid 
epidemic, crumbling infrastructure, a decaying educational system, unaffordable 
health care, and so on. What sounded good in 1980 sounds increasingly stilted and 
out of touch by 2018.  
Second, the regime’s commitments of ideology and interest eventually drove a 
wedge between the party’s ideological elites and the party’s rank and file, which 
increasingly consists of white working class voters.34 These voters may support 
reducing government programs for the poor, especially if they believe that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Nate Cohn, How the Obama Coalition Crumbled, Leaving an Opening for Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/upshot/how-the-obama 
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REAL CLEAR POL. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016 
/11/17/republican_party_the_strongest_its_been_in_80_years.html [https://perma.cc/UZX9 
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 32. Id. 
 33. Eric Boehm, Democrats Got Wrecked Again in State Legislative Races, and It 
Matters More than You Might Think, REASON (Nov. 14, 2016), https://reason.com/blog 
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 34. David Frum, The Great Republican Revolt, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/01/the-great-republican-revolt/419118 
[https://perma.cc/D554-WYVT]. 
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benefits will be enjoyed primarily by racial minorities. But they may not support 
dismantling Social Security and Medicare and other features of the social safety net 
on which they depend. Globalization also drove a wedge between businesses’ 
support for free trade and immigration reform and working class opposition to both 
positions. 
Third, the regime strongly supported campaign finance deregulation and First 
Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws. Deregulation changed how 
campaigns are financed and ultimately undermined the Republican Party. 
Deregulation allowed huge sums of money to enter politics and allowed wealthy 
individual donors to act increasingly independently of the party’s organizational 
leadership. The result was the rise of financial “warlords” who act independent of 
the party apparatus and who increasingly call the tune in candidate selection and in 
primary challenges.35 This encouraged increasingly radical positioning on the right, 
as candidates lined up to please donors. 
Fourth, the Reagan regime also committed itself to the defense of traditional 
sexual norms, family values, conservative views about race and race relations, 
opposition to multiculturalism—in short, to fighting the culture wars. Although this 
often helped mobilize voters, it eventually produced mixed results. Conservatives 
repeatedly lost key battles in the culture wars, forcing them to perpetually retreat 
from more conservative positions, for example, on gay rights. These battles over 
sexuality, as well as the use of racially charged issues to mobilize the base, may 
have worked well in the short run. But in the long run, they turned off increasing 
numbers of younger voters, college-educated voters, and women, who became 
independents or defected to the Democrats.36 
Fifth, the regime’s strategy of polarization, opposition, and obstruction, which 
helped Newt Gingrich and his successors gain control of Congress and stymie 
Barack Obama’s administration, eventually encouraged internal factionalism, 
radicalism, and hostility to compromise.37 This made it more difficult to govern 
effectively when Republicans were in power. 
Sixth, the regime has been increasingly unable to win national Presidential 
majorities since 1992. From that point on the Republican Party has won the 
national popular vote only once, in 2004. The other two times it gained the 
presidency it had to rely on Electoral College victories.38 The last time this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES 
BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 165–68 (2016) (describing the role of powerful 
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44 (2012) (describing consequences of Republican strategies of polarization). 
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happened, in 2016, it lost the popular vote by almost three million votes.39 The 
party has had to rely increasingly on partisan gerrymandering and restricting 
minorities’ access to the ballot to maintain political control. 
A. Where Are We in Political Time? 
Seventh, and finally, the current Republican President, Donald Trump, is in an 
especially precarious position in the life cycle of the Reagan regime. To explain 
this point, I will need to describe in some detail Skowronek’s analysis of the 
different political situations in which successive Presidents find themselves during 
the life cycle of regimes. Skowronek calls the progress of these various situations 
political time.40 
Skowronek classifies the political situation Presidents face—and therefore the 
kind of Presidents they are likely to become—according to whether they take office 
when a regime is robust or debilitated, and whether they are allied to the existing 
regime or opposed to it.41 
Donald Trump is a Republican who becomes President during the Reagan 
regime. According to Skowronek, Trump may have inherited one of four possible 
political situations. 
Reconstructive Presidents successfully overturn a weakened regime and begin a 
new one.42 They lead the opposition party to become the newly dominant party. 
Examples of reconstructive Presidents are the first Presidents in each new regime: 
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan. Presidents who achieve such a 
reconstruction are usually considered as among our most successful.43 If Trump is a 
reconstructive President, then he would be trying to overturn Reaganism and the 
conservative movement and create a new Trumpist regime. 
Affiliated Presidents are allied with the regime and take office later in political 
time.44 They try to keep faith with the regime’s commitments under changing 
circumstances. Skowronek describes them as “orthodox-innovators.”45 Examples in 
the New Deal/Civil Rights regime would be Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; 
examples in the Reagan regime would be George H.W. Bush and George W. 
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 39. Id. 
 40. SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 30; SKOWRONEK, 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME, supra note 21, at 27. Skowronek distinguishes 
political time from secular time, which describes the evolution of power structures. 
SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 30. He argues that as time 
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for Presidents to displace the existing order and create a new one. See infra note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
 41. SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 36. 
 42. Id. at 36–39; SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME, supra note 
21, at 92–98. 
 43. SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME, supra note 21, at 94. 
 44. SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 41–43; 
SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME, supra note 21, at 99–104. 
 45. SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 14, 88, 350. 
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Bush.46 If Trump were an affiliated President, he would present himself as an 
orthodox Reaganite who is trying to keep the factions in his party united. 
Preemptive Presidents come from opposition parties; they swim against the tide 
of a still powerful regime, so they must compromise, triangulate, and find a “third 
way.”47 Examples in the New Deal/Civil Rights regime would be Eisenhower and 
Nixon; examples in the Reagan regime would be Clinton and Obama.48 If Trump 
were a preemptive President, he would be opposed to Reaganism and the 
conservative movement and seek to find a third way between the two political 
parties. 
The final category, disjunctive Presidents, are leaders who come from the 
dominant party but have the misfortune to take over when the regime is on its last 
legs.49 Here the President tries to repair and reform a decrepit regime that has lost 
its coherence and legitimacy; the leader attempts this by selectively breaking with 
party orthodoxy in specific ways to shore up public support and reform the party’s 
base. But because the coalition has become so debilitated and weakened, the leader 
is not up to the task, and therefore presides over the regime’s dissolution.50 Jimmy 
Carter, the last Democrat in the New Deal/Civil Rights regime, and Herbert 
Hoover, the last Republican in the long Republican regime, are key examples. 
Disjunctive presidencies are usually regarded as failures. 
The following diagram sums up Skowronek’s account of the different styles of 
presidential leadership: 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME, supra note 21, at 99–104. 
 47. SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 43–45; 
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 49. SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE, supra note 21, at 39–41; 
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Table 2. Presidential Leadership Styles in Skowronek’s Theory of Political Time51 
President Takes 
Office: 
When the Current Regime Is 
Vulnerable 
When the Current Regime Is 
Robust 
Opposed to the 
Current Regime 
Reconstructive 
Repudiates old politics and 
clears ground for a new regime. 
Examples: Jefferson, Jackson, 
Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Reagan. 
Preemptive 
Offers a third way to shore up 
legitimacy. 
Examples: Tyler, Filmore, 
Cleveland, Wilson, Eisenhower, 
Nixon, and Clinton. 
 
Allied with the 
Current Regime 
Disjunctive 
Coalition falls apart; 
President presides over the 
dissolution of the regime. 
Examples: J. Adams, J.Q. 
Adams, Buchanan, Hoover, and 
Carter. 
Affiliated 
Must articulate regime’s 
commitments and balance party 
orthodoxy against the need for 
innovation; tries to mollify 
multiple factions. 
Examples: Madison, Monroe, 
Polk, Grant, T. Roosevelt, Taft, 
Truman, Kennedy, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, and George H.W. Bush. 
 
Where are we in political time? To decide this question, we should ask which 
description of presidential leadership best fits Trump’s situation.52 
It is unlikely that Trump is a reconstructive President. He did not run against the 
philosophy of Reaganism or claim that he sought to displace it. Like other 
Republican primary candidates, he sought to compare himself to Reagan, and his 
primary campaign slogan, Make America Great Again, originated with Reagan.53 
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He has strongly supported the religious right and nominated conservative pro-life 
judges vetted by the Federalist Society.54 With only a few important exceptions (to 
be discussed later), his policies and his judicial appointments have been very 
conservative and characteristic of a conservative Republican President.55 
For the same reasons, Trump is not a preemptive President; he did not come into 
office from an opposition party, trying to swim against the tide of Reaganism and 
seeking to find a way to compromise with the dominant party or triangulate 
between the two parties’ positions. He is the leader of the regime’s dominant party, 
the Republicans. The members of his party have strongly supported him, not 
because they like his personal behavior or his political principles (he doesn’t seem 
to have many settled principles), but rather because his policies have been largely 
consistent with those of a very conservative Republican.56 The President he most 
sought to repudiate was not Ronald Reagan but Barack Obama, and if Obama was a 
preemptive President in the Reagan regime, it’s hard to see how Trump could be 
one too.57 
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Could Trump be the first President who faces such a politics of permanent preemption? 
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Trump might well be an affiliated President like George W. Bush. As noted 
above, after his election, Trump and his appointees have acted like very 
conservative Republicans on a wide range of issues. On the other hand, Trump has 
departed from Republican orthodoxy in several ways: his rejection of free trade, his 
defense of middle-class entitlements such as Social Security and Medicare, and his 
repeated calls for huge public works and infrastructure projects. During the 
campaign Trump also criticized George W. Bush’s hawkish foreign policy, 
distanced himself from the Iraq War, and even blamed Bush for failing to prevent 
the 9/11 attacks.58 
Trump’s opposition to free trade and his draconian rhetoric on immigration 
suggest that although he is not abandoning the regime’s commitments to 
deregulatory capitalism, low taxes, and the culture wars, he is trying to renovate 
and repair the regime. He is adapting it to a changing Republican base of white, 
working class voters, especially those without college degrees. 
Trump, in other words, seems to be trying to give the Reagan regime a new 
lease on life, or a new shot of legitimacy, by pushing it in a strongly populist and 
nativist direction.59 And he is offering himself as a nonideological outsider who has 
the special talents to fix things. According to Skowronek’s model, this style of 
leadership makes him most like a disjunctive President. As Skowronek puts it:  
[O]ne of the great ironies of the politics of disjunction is that the 
Presidents who come to office in these sorts of situations tend to have 
only the most tenuous relationship to the establishments they represent. 
Long-festering problems within the regime tend to throw up leaders 
only nominally affiliated with it, and in their efforts to address the 
issues of the day, these affiliates often press major departures of their 
own from the standard formulas and priorities set in the old agenda. 
The political effect of these departures is disjunctive: they sever the 
political moorings of the old regime and cast it adrift without anchor or 
orientation.60 
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preemptive mold, bobbing and weaving within institutions that constrain him. He does not 
appear to have embraced the pragmatic, triangulating approach of Eisenhower, Nixon, 
Clinton, or Obama. Quite the contrary: he seems to have moved sharply to the right, 
reshaped political norms of appropriate behavior, and achieved a rare degree of loyalty from 
the members of his own party; the last is something that preemptive Presidents rarely 
achieve. 
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This description seems to fit Trump quite well. 
Trump fits the disjunctive pattern in a second way. As differences within the 
coalition become increasingly obvious and difficult to manage, disjunctive 
candidates argue that they are able to fix things because they have special technical 
abilities. For example, they might portray themselves as extremely skilled 
politicians (John Quincy Adams, James Buchanan), outstanding technocrats and 
problem solvers (Herbert Hoover, Jimmy Carter); or, as in Trump’s case, 
outstanding deal makers.61 They explain to the public that what is important is not 
ideological purity but the ability to get things done. As Skowronek puts it, in the 
last days of a regime, mastery of technique—in this case dealmaking and business 
acumen—“is a hallmark of the politics of disjunction.”62 Focusing on technique 
allows the new President to remain ambiguous about his or her positions, allowing 
everyone in the coalition to believe that it will get what it wants. 
We won’t really know if Trump is a disjunctive President until he leaves office. 
But many of the signs are present. And when we combine Skowronek’s account of 
Presidential leadership with the other pieces of evidence identified above, there is a 
very good chance that Trump does not represent the beginning of a new politics in 
America but the end of an older one.63 
III. THE CYCLE OF POLARIZATION 
President Trump, as I have just argued, is a symptom of the decadence of the 
Reagan regime. But Trump is also a symptom of another political phenomenon, 
which brings me to the second of the three cycles of constitutional time that I’m 
interested in—the cycle of polarization and depolarization. 
American politics features very long cycles of polarization and depolarization 
between the political parties.64 As you might expect, political polarization peaks 
just around the time of the Civil War. Things stay pretty polarized for a long time. 
Until late in the nineteenth century, for example, Republicans ran political 
campaigns by “waiving the bloody shirt”—reminding voters that the Democrats 
were the party of secession and slavery and therefore could not be trusted to 
govern.65 Right around the beginning of the twentieth century, polarization begins 
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to recede, and it continues to decline rapidly until the New Deal era.66 The New 
Deal/Civil Rights regime features a largely depolarized politics. In fact, during this 
period there are effectively three different parties: Northern Democrats, Southern 
Democrats, and Republicans.67 These three large coalitions have cross-cutting 
interests that make a wide array of legislative solutions possible. This is the 
political configuration that produces Social Security and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act during the New Deal, but it also produces the great civil rights acts of the 
1960s, which are bipartisan projects of Northern Democrats and moderate to liberal 
Republicans.68 
The civil rights reforms coincided with a transformation of Southern politics. 
Following World War II, and especially after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 
South gradually evolved from an apartheid region with one-party politics into a 
region more like the rest of the country, with two competitive political parties.69 
But the civil rights reforms had an undesired side effect. They precipitated 
realignment between the two parties, as white Southerners flocked to the 
Republican Party and the two parties began to repolarize, especially around race 
and cultural issues.70 
Polarization became a project of the Republican Party during the 1990s. Newt 
Gingrich saw it as the best way for Republicans to become a majority party that 
could not only win Presidential elections (as Nixon and Reagan had) but could also 
control Congress and state governments. Gingrich perfected a new slash-and-burn 
style of rhetoric that portrayed his political enemies as sexually deviant, dangerous, 
and unpatriotic.71 The conservative movement created counter-institutions to 
promote conservative ideas, and conservative media—talk radio and Fox News 
being the most obvious examples—helped make political polarization a viable 
political strategy.72 The result was asymmetric polarization. Democrats moved a 
little to the left, in part because conservative Southern Democrats gradually left the 
party, while the Republican base moved far to the right.73 
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Increasing polarization destroyed the system of compromise politics that 
characterized the New Deal/Civil Rights era. Conservative Democrats and liberal 
Republicans became increasingly rare to virtually nonexistent.74 Unsurprisingly, 
because there was little overlap between the positions of members of the two 
parties, political compromise became increasingly difficult. Obstruction is a 
predictable result when there is no middle ground. Today there is a de facto rule 
that it takes sixty votes in the Senate to pass any important legislation because the 
party opposite the President will filibuster if they don’t already control the 
majority. This phenomenon is relatively recent. It is a product of the 1990s, 
developed as a strategy of obstruction.75 
One might have hoped that the disputed election of 2000 would have led the 
George W. Bush administration to attempt to mend political fences and work to 
tamp down the forces of polarization. Bush, who had cooperated with Democrats as 
Governor of Texas, had sought to portray himself as “a uniter, not a divider.”76 A 
further opportunity for unity came after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
But the forces of polarization were far too strong and, more to the point, far too 
tempting for politicians seeking short-term electoral gains. The Bush 
administration’s chief political strategist, Karl Rove, recognized that Republicans 
were more likely to win national elections if they appealed to their base of loyal 
voters and got them out to vote in large numbers.77 Such a base strategy encourages 
deliberately polarizing the electorate so that the base will be energized to turn out 
—because they come to believe that the other party can’t be trusted to govern. 
The problem with the rhetoric and strategy of polarization is that it is good for 
getting elected but not particularly good for governing, unless, of course, one can 
gain a sixty-vote majority in the Senate, a working majority in the House, and 
control of the Presidency. The strategy of polarization helped Republicans become 
the dominant party during the Reagan regime,78 but it had unfortunate effects 
—another example of how the path of victory for a dominant party in a political 
regime may contribute to its undoing later on. 
Polarization and obstruction make it more difficult for Congress to reach 
compromises. For a time this meshed well with an ideological message that 
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government is incompetent and therefore we should have smaller government and 
less regulation. But it made governing difficult when Republicans were in power. 
Polarization also helped encourage the rise of increasingly radical factions within 
the party who valued ideological purity over compromise and obstruction over 
legislative success.79 
A gridlocked Congress also encourages Presidents to assert ever greater 
authority in governing, both in foreign policy and through creative uses of the 
administrative state.80 An expansive conception of executive power and unilateral 
Presidential action might have been fine when Republicans controlled the White 
House, but it created an opening for Democrats like Barack Obama to use similar 
strategies to push for immigration and environmental reforms. As a result, 
conservative Republicans have become increasingly critical of the executive’s 
control of the administrative state.81 This is a reverse of the conservative stance at 
the beginning of the Reagan era, when conservatives wanted the President to take 
greater control of the bureaucracy, and they developed the constitutional theory of 
the unitary executive and promoted the theory of Chevron deference.82 
The final irony of the strategy of polarization and obstructionism was that when 
Republicans finally gained control of all three branches of government in 2017, 
they were unable to repeal Obamacare. Because Democrats could filibuster 
legislation when Republicans had less than sixty votes in the Senate, Republicans 
had to use complex reconciliation rules to repeal Obamacare by a simple majority. 
This greatly limited the kinds of reforms they could adopt; these limitations and the 
budgetary constraints of the reconciliation rules created divisions within their own 
coalition, ultimately dooming the repeal. 
Polarization and obstruction have also led to an unwieldy form of governance. 
Congress no longer uses its ordinary appropriations process. Instead of a series of 
bills passed through the committee system, party leaders negotiate with each other 
for grand omnibus appropriations bills that are packed with multiple policy riders, 
conditions, and subsidies.83 These bills keep the government running until the next 
deadline, at which point party leaders negotiate under time pressure to produce a 
new grand appropriations measure, which leaders then present to Congress without 
much deliberation, essentially on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This policy of 
legislative brinksmanship—lurching from big appropriations bill to big 
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appropriations bill—is the only way that congressional leaders can transcend the 
bitter polarization and political dysfunction characteristic of the late Reagan 
regime.84 It keeps the government running, but it precludes serious policy 
deliberation, much less any sustained attempt to deal with serious public problems. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
So far I have talked about the cycle of regimes and the cycle of polarization. The 
third cycle of constitutional time is the cycle of rot and renewal. But in order to 
explain this cycle, I need to introduce another key idea. This is the idea of 
constitutional crisis.85 
One of the most common claims by journalists and commentators during the 
Trump administration has been that America is in the middle of a constitutional 
crisis, or that if a certain thing happens—for example, if Trump fires Special 
Prosecutor Robert Mueller—we will be hurled into a constitutional crisis. People 
said this after the first travel ban was announced;86 they said it again when 
President Trump fired FBI Director James Comey;87 they have announced the 
imminent arrival of a constitutional crisis on any number of occasions since then.88 
But at least as of this writing—the summer of 2018—the United States is not in 
a constitutional crisis. Let me explain what a constitutional crisis is, and why we 
are not in the middle of one. 
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Constitutions do many things—they protect rights, and they distribute powers 
and duties. But above all, a constitution is a device for making politics possible 
—politics, that is, as opposed to violence, insurrection, and civil war. The central 
point of a constitution is to channel people’s disagreements and struggles for power 
into a system of law and political procedures so that these disagreements and 
struggles for power do not break down or break out into violence, civil war, or 
insurrection.89 We can therefore say that a constitution is achieving its central 
function when it can cabin the desire for power—and the desire for dominance, 
which is always present in human affairs—into political struggles within the 
constitutional system. 
A constitution fails when it is unable to perform that central task. And this can 
happen in one of three ways. 
First, at some point, political officials, most importantly the President, can 
simply announce that they will no longer abide by the rules of the Constitution.90 
Political leaders—or military leaders—might argue that things have gotten so bad 
and the country has strayed so far off course that they can no longer possibly stay 
within the boundaries of the Constitution. We have to save the country, they will 
exclaim; we must deal with internal or external enemies and threats, and therefore 
we must—perhaps temporarily—stop following the Constitution. A constitutional 
crisis of the first type might also occur if political leaders refuse to obey a judicial 
order directed to them. That would undermine a central feature of constitutional 
government. For officials to say that they won’t abide by the Constitution or direct 
judicial orders precipitates a constitutional crisis, because officials refuse to abide 
by the very device that keeps struggles for power and authority inside politics and 
within the basic law of the Constitution. 
The second kind of crisis occurs when everybody thinks that they are following 
the Constitution, and the result is disaster.91 For example, the Constitution might 
demand that leaders do something—or not do something—in a way that leads 
directly to disaster. Or people may believe that the Constitution does not provide 
for a certain event so that everyone is paralyzed and disaster strikes. In this second 
type of crisis, everyone goes off the cliff together, like a bunch of lemmings. If the 
first type of crisis is a crisis of constitutional disobedience, we might think of the 
second type as a crisis of excessive constitutional fidelity—or, more correctly, a 
crisis of fidelity produced by a total lack of constitutional imagination and 
innovation. This last point explains why this second sort of crisis almost never 
happens. When people find themselves in a predicament—for example, they don’t 
know what the Constitution requires—they will usually be able to reinterpret the 
Constitution to get out of the predicament.92 That doesn’t mean that everyone will 
agree on the interpretive solution. But it does mean that the difficulty turns into a 
dispute about constitutional interpretation that can be resolved within the 
constitutional system. 
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The third type of crisis is closest to what people usually think of when they talk 
about a constitutional crisis. This crisis occurs when people disagree about what the 
Constitution means, and they disagree so strongly that they do not simply confine 
themselves to legislative votes and litigation, or to op-eds, tweets, press 
conferences, and protests.93 Instead, they take to the streets and riot. They engage in 
violence. They engage in secession. Or they engage in civil war.94 Now that’s a 
constitutional crisis. The Constitution has failed to keep political struggle within its 
proper boundaries—that is to say, within the boundaries of political competition set 
by the Constitution.  
Constitutional crisis, in other words, means reaching a point in which the 
Constitution is about to fail, or has already failed, at its central task—of making 
politics possible. The U.S. Constitution has been remarkably durable. There have 
been countless times during our history in which political officials have disobeyed 
the law—just think about the many times each year that local governments, states, 
and the federal government get sued—but these legal violations are not by 
themselves constitutional crises. There have been a small number of genuine crises 
in which the Constitution was on the verge of failure. But the Constitution has only 
broken down as a system of politics once in our history. That failure occurred 
during the Civil War. The Constitution failed because Americans were unable to 
keep the disputes that led to the Civil War within politics, and instead, the situation 
degenerated into violence and rebellion. 
Political crises abound in American history—the Watergate scandals and the 
Clinton impeachment are good examples—but they usually are resolved within the 
constitutional order. And, as noted above, government officials often violate the 
law—that’s why we have a system of courts. Real constitutional crises, on the other 
hand, are very rare. Even political crises that veer on the edge of a genuine 
constitutional crisis are rare.95 
Generally speaking, we almost never face the first kind of crisis—in which the 
President or other leaders announce that they will not abide by the Constitution or 
obey direct judicial orders. One reason for that is that lawyers are usually able to 
come up with creative interpretations so that politicians can assert that they are 
being faithful to the Constitution, so the conflict resolves to a conflict over 
interpretation that is settled either in the courts or through the give and take of 
ordinary politics.96 
The second kind of crisis is also very rare, and for much the same reason. 
Americans are very clever at interpreting the Constitution, so if lawyers and 
politicians come across a problem that they initially think can’t be solved, or for 
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which the Constitution appears to provide no solution, they will simply work at 
reinterpreting the Constitution until they think they have solved the problem. 
The third kind of crisis is also very rare. The Civil War is the central example. 
People often disagree heatedly about what the Constitution means. But they usually 
turn to the courts to settle the question, or else the issue is resolved through politics. 
The point of a constitution is not to prevent disagreement and dispute; it is to 
channel disagreement and dispute into peaceful solutions within law and politics. 
That does not mean that disputes are always resolved correctly or justly. It merely 
means that disputes are settled within the constitutional system. Avoiding 
constitutional crisis is not the same thing as securing justice. One can have a great 
deal of injustice in a constitutional system without precipitating a constitutional 
crisis. In fact, one might note ruefully that injustice has often been the price of 
political stability in the United States. The American Constitution has been read to 
allow a great deal of injustice during its 230 or so years of existence. But it has 
faced few constitutional breakdowns. 
Armed with this analysis of constitutional crisis, we can see that none of the 
things that people have complained about are genuine constitutional crises. When 
President Trump issued the first version of the travel ban and there was chaos at 
American airports, people said it was a constitutional crisis.97 It wasn’t. Rather, 
what happened is that the administration litigated the constitutionality of the travel 
ban (and its successors) in the federal courts.98 That is how we are supposed to 
resolve constitutional disputes. Again, some people worried that firing FBI Director 
James Comey constituted a constitutional crisis, and other people worry that if 
President Trump dismisses Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller, that would be a 
constitutional crisis.99 Neither of these things is the case. The President has the 
legal power to fire the FBI director,100 and he also has the power to order officials 
in the Justice Department to dismiss the special prosecutor with cause.101 To be 
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sure, firing Mueller would precipitate a political crisis—just as President Nixon’s 
firing of Archibald Cox precipitated a political crisis that ultimately led to Nixon’s 
impeachment a year later. But a political crisis resolved through the courts and 
through constitutional processes of impeachment and removal is not a 
constitutional crisis.102 
A related concern is the fear that the President will refuse a subpoena by Special 
Prosecutor Mueller.103 If he litigates the question, there is no constitutional crisis. If 
the Supreme Court issues a direct order to the President, and he refuses to obey, 
that would be a constitutional crisis. This is what people feared would happen in 
the Watergate scandal: they feared that President Nixon would refuse to obey a 
subpoena ordering him to surrender the Watergate tapes.104 But Nixon complied 
with the Supreme Court’s order, and so there was no constitutional crisis. On the 
other hand, if Nixon had said, “I’m not going to give up the tapes, and I’m going to 
burn them on the White House lawn,” that would have been a constitutional 
crisis.105 
Here I will add an important qualification. Constitutional crisis doesn’t have to 
refer only to the actual moment of constitutional failure. It might also refer to a 
period in which the possibility of constitutional failure is real and palpable.106 The 
best analogy would be to a medical crisis, in which a patient’s condition hovers 
between life and death. One might therefore argue that if there is a serious 
probability that the President will announce that he will discard constitutional limits 
or will refuse to obey a direct judicial order—that period of uncertainty is a 
constitutional crisis, even if the President ultimately backs away. Thus, if one 
believed that Nixon was planning to spurn the Supreme Court’s order to surrender 
the Watergate tapes in 1974, one would be justified in saying that the country was 
on the brink of a constitutional crisis. 
Therefore, if people reasonably believe that President Trump is about to jettison 
the Constitution or defy the courts, it is fair to say that this is a period of 
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constitutional crisis as well as a period of political crisis. (Imagine, for example, 
that the President is duly impeached and removed from office, but refuses to leave 
and calls on the military to support him.) But this has not yet happened. The Trump 
administration has repeatedly fought out its disputes about the Constitution in the 
courts of law and the court of public opinion. 
I therefore conclude that we are not in a constitutional crisis at present in the 
United States, although we can expect many moments of political crisis in the next 
several years. I do not say that we will never be in a moment of constitutional 
crisis—merely that this is not our present situation. Many people worry that we are 
on the brink of such a constitutional crisis. They worry that, any day now, the 
President is going to tweet: “That was a nice Constitution you had there, but it’s 
over. Sad!” But no matter how outrageous some of his public statements have been, 
he has not crossed that particular Rubicon. Let us hope he never does. 
Even so, people sense that there is something deeply wrong with American 
politics, and that is why they are using the language of constitutional crisis 
—incorrectly, in my view—to describe it. There is, however, a better, more 
accurate way to describe our current political situation. I turn to that question now. 
It lies at the heart of the third of the political cycles we are living through.  
V. THE CYCLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ROT 
We are not living in a period of constitutional crisis. But we are—and have been 
for some time—been living in a situation of constitutional rot.107 What is 
constitutional rot? It is the decay of the features of a constitutional system that 
maintain it both as a democracy and as a republic.108 That basic idea has a number 
of entailments, which I will now try to elaborate. 
The word “republic” comes from the Latin res publica, a public thing.109 A 
republic is more than a representative form of government. It is a joint enterprise by 
citizens and their representatives to pursue and promote the public good.110As I will 
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describe in a moment, republics are delicate institutions, often subject to decay, and 
both the public and the governing elites are often distracted from their public-
spirited purpose. When a republic decays, it loses its connection to the joint pursuit 
of the public good. Government officials lose their connection to the public good. 
Then the country becomes an oligarchy or an autocracy.111 
It is common to think of our current political problems in terms of gridlock. 
Government can’t seem to respond to public problems, or, indeed, get anything of 
importance done. Congress can barely keep the government funded and running.112 
The diagnosis of gridlock made more sense when there was divided government. 
But since the 2016 election, the national government hasn’t been divided. During 
the first two years of the Trump Presidency we have had unitary government with 
Republicans in charge. And yet we still have dysfunction. So although it is 
undoubtedly true that increasing polarization is part of the problem, something else 
much deeper is going on. That something else is constitutional rot. 
In the past forty years or so, the United States has increasingly become both less 
democratic and less republican.113 By less democratic, I mean that it is increasingly 
unresponsive to popular opinion and popular will. By less republican, I mean that 
representatives are increasingly less devoted to the public good, rather than to 
pleasing or paying off a relatively small set of powerful individuals and groups.114  
Constitutional rot is the process through which a constitutional system becomes 
less democratic and less republican over time. When we talk of constitutional rot, 
therefore, we are interested both in failures of democracy—that is, responsiveness 
to public opinion and public will—and failures of republicanism—that is, public 
officials’ devotion to the public good. When public servants are increasingly 
diverted into the pursuit of their own wealth, or when they are increasingly diverted 
into serving the interests of a relatively small number of very powerful individuals, 
democracy and republicanism decay, and we have constitutional rot. And when 
public officials are no longer responsive either to public will or to the public good, 
and instead serve the interests of a small group of powerful and wealthy people, the 
result is oligarchy—rule by the few. 
Constitutional rot has a second dimension: the gradual destruction of political 
norms of mutual forbearance and fair political competition that make it possible for 
people who disagree with each other to jointly pursue the public good.115 Republics 
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depend on more than mere obedience to the letter of the law. They depend on well-
functioning institutions that balance and check power and ambition, and 
conventions that require government officials to behave in a public-spirited 
fashion.116 Republics also depend on mutual toleration and forbearance that makes 
it possible for contending sides to view each other not as implacable enemies that 
must be eliminated but as fellow citizens who, despite their differences, all aim at 
the larger goal of serving the res publica.117 
Some of these norms concern rule of law values. For example, political leaders 
must not misuse the executive power to punish their political enemies or attempt to 
imprison them. Others concern electoral integrity: politicians must respect the 
results of fair elections, and they must not try to rig the electoral system to entrench 
themselves in power. These and similar norms prevent ambitious politicians from 
overreaching, entrenching themselves and their ideological allies, and undermining 
public trust in democracy. When politicians abide by these norms, they help 
promote cooperation between different political parties and factions, even when 
opponents strongly disagree about the proper direction of politics. Finally, these 
norms prevent politicians from privileging short-term political gains over long-term 
injuries to the health of the constitutional system. 
A third dimension of constitutional rot involves the gradual loss of the kinds of 
trust that are necessary for republics to function properly: trust between members 
of the public, trust between the public and government officials, and trust among 
government officials of different parties.118 For republics to succeed, the public 
must not view their fellow citizens as incorrigible and implacable enemies. They 
must trust that government officials will usually exercise power in the public 
interest and not for their own personal benefit or for the benefit of private interests 
and cronies. Public officials need to trust that their political opponents will respect 
fair rules of political competition and will not overreach or manipulate the 
mechanisms of government to unfairly entrench themselves in power and seek to 
punish their political enemies.  
Norms of mutual forbearance and fair competition ultimately depend on trust. 
When trust decays, these norms are weakened, producing a vicious cycle. If the 
public loses trust in public officials, they will become cynical and despairing, and 
they will turn to demagogues.119 If public officials cannot trust each other to behave 
responsibly and fairly, they will refuse to cooperate. As their mutual suspicion 
grows, they will discard norms of fair competition; they will try to grab as much 
power as possible and punish their adversaries before their adversaries can lock 
them out of power and punish them instead. When politicians become beholden to 
a small set of powerful interests and persons, discard norms of fair political 
competition, undermine public trust, and repeatedly overreach by using 
constitutional hardball to rig the system in their favor and keep themselves (or their 
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allies) in power, they cause democracy and republicanism to decay.120 All of these 
phenomena produce constitutional rot.  
A. Republican Insurance 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution understood that republics are especially 
susceptible to rot. Many people remember what Benjamin Franklin is supposed to 
have said when a woman asked him to describe the new Constitution—“A republic, 
Madam, if you can keep it.”121 But behind that famous quote is an important story. 
It sounds as if Franklin is joking when he says, “if you can keep it.” But he wasn’t 
joking. Near the very end of the Philadelphia convention, just as the framers were 
about to ship the new Constitution off to the states for ratification, Franklin made 
an important speech, which appears in Madison’s notes. Franklin told the delegates 
that the new American government “is likely to be well administered for a course 
of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when 
the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being 
incapable of any other.”122  
When Franklin spoke, everyone in the room understood what he was saying. 
Many of the framers had read the classics of ancient history, and they understood 
that republics are very difficult to keep going.123 All republics are susceptible to 
constitutional rot. All republics eventually become corrupted. And up to that point 
in history, all republics had eventually fallen, turning into despotisms, tyrannies, or 
rule by the mob. The framers had read Aristotle and Polybius, and they knew that 
ancient writers believed that this is how things usually ended up.124 
Why are republics so difficult to maintain? Because of ambition, because of 
greed, because of the ever-present lust for power among human beings. The 
fragility of republics is a consequence of the fragility of human goodness. The 
people in republics may start out devoted to the public good, but over time they 
stray, for many reasons—including, ambition, wealth, power, and the urge to 
dominate others.125 
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The Framers knew that this had happened over and over again in human history. 
They believed it would eventually happen to the American Constitution. And so 
they drafted their new constitution with various devices to try to limit the cycle of 
republican rot, to have things bottom out before the country turned to mob rule, 
oligarchy, or dictatorship.126 Their goal, in other words, was to buy time for 
democracy so that the inevitable periods of constitutional rot would be followed by 
periods of constitutional renewal. 
This way of understanding our constitutional system differs from our usual 
concern with constitutional doctrine, with principles of limited government, or even 
with the preservation of liberty. Focusing on constitutional rot is a structural 
consideration—but a consideration connected to the belief that history operates in 
cycles of rot and renewal. Many of the Constitution’s structural features—
federalism, separation of powers, checks and balances, an independent judiciary, 
staggered elections for the two Houses of Congress and the President, fixed terms 
for the executive—may be understood not only in terms of limits on government 
power, but also in terms of the dangers of constitutional rot. These structural 
features operate to dampen and limit the downside of inevitable decay in our 
republican institutions—to keep democracy afloat and republicanism running until 
the political system has a chance to renew and right itself. The goal is to ensure that 
although things may get bad at various points in time, the republic never 
completely falls apart, so that it can bottom out and renew itself eventually. 
Separation of powers, federalism, an independent judiciary, and staggered election 
cycles help guarantee that there is always a locus of opposition, a political space in 
which oppositional groups can safely form, in which pressures for reform can gain 
strength and are not completely snuffed out or shut out of power. So too, an 
independent judiciary helps ensure that federal judges aren’t simply under the 
thumb of a charismatic leader. 
If one looks at the Constitution this way, it is not merely a blueprint for liberty, 
it is also an insurance policy for republics.127 Republics are at the mercy of time. 
They will get better and worse. They will get more public spirited and less public 
spirited. They will decay and they will renew themselves. Sometimes the people we 
elect will be very good people, sometimes they will be venal and incompetent. 
Sometimes they will be thoroughly corrupt. The country will cycle through decades 
of ebb and flow, renewal and decline. But the central point of a Constitution like 
                                                                                                                 
citizens, they were very fragile polities, extremely liable to corruption.”); Balkin, supra note 
110, at 1444 (“[T]ime is the great enemy of republics, because as time goes on and 
circumstances change, corruption finds ever-new ways of entering the system, weakening 
the institutions and practices that ensure republican government.”). 
 126. See JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 61 
(1979) (“The possibility of a national demagogue was one of the greatest fears of the 
Founders and literally frames The Federalist, being mentioned in both the first and last 
numbers.”); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 352 
(2009) (“The Constitution was intended to provide structural encouragements to keep the 
logic and language of society as a whole from becoming corrupt, representing a technical 
and moral response to what they saw as a technical and moral problem.”). 
 127. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An Exchange, 50 
IND. L. REV. 281 (2016). 
284 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:253 
 
America’s is to create a system that, even if ungainly in the best of times, can 
buffer itself against the worst of times. 
There is a price to pay for these fail-safes, these forms of republican insurance. 
The most important price is that our constitutional system has many veto points that 
prevent it from being fully democratic. It is not very efficient in responding to 
popular will even in the best of times. That may lead to public frustration. But the 
ability of opponents to resist and derail change is the political price, the premium, if 
you will, that Americans pay for republican insurance. If you believe, as the 
Framers did, that rot and decay in republics are inevitable, that premium is 
probably well worth paying. Nothing is more certain than that American  
politics will go through periods of rot and decay, and that Americans will go 
through a cycle of corruption, cynicism, and despair. It has happened before. It is 
happening now. 
B. The Four Horsemen of Constitutional Rot 
Many factors have contributed to our present case of constitutional rot. They 
include the gradual breakdown in the party system; changes in how campaigns are 
financed; and the enormous power of dark money in deciding who gets elected, and 
in influencing what people do once they obtain office.128  
Another important set of causes concern long-term changes in the structure of 
mass media, which have encouraged polarization and political distrust, and 
hastened the merger of politics with entertainment.129 After all, we now have a 
reality TV star as President. 
These changes in the structure of media have made the public more susceptible 
to propaganda, a term I use advisedly. Propaganda was an important tool for 
maintaining political power in the former Soviet Union. The United States is now 
flush with propaganda of the sort that would have done the Soviets proud. Some of 
this propaganda comes from outside the country,130 but a lot of the propaganda 
comes from inside the country.131 And whatever its source, it is having serious 
effects on American democracy.  
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Propaganda is more than false information. It is designed to confuse and divide 
people.132 It sets people at each other’s throats and makes it difficult for people to 
know what is true and what is false. As a result, people simply come to believe that 
no one and nothing can be trusted. This causes them to rely on their existing 
prejudices and to root ever more strongly for their political team. Propaganda 
discourages rational thought about policy and encourages emotional identification 
with one’s tribe.133 Thus, by blurring the line between the true and the false, and by 
making it difficult to know what is true and false, effective propaganda encourages 
polarization and exacerbates mutual distrust within society. It corrodes the public 
trust that is necessary to republican government, and it undermines the formation of 
public opinion that is necessary to democratic government.134 
There are four basic causes of constitutional rot—I call them the Four Horsemen 
of Constitutional Rot.135 The first is political polarization. The second is loss of 
trust in government and, equally important, in one’s fellow citizens. The third is 
increasing economic inequality. The fourth is “policy disasters”—a term coined by 
Stephen Griffin; it refers to major failures in policy making by our 
representatives.136 Recent examples of policy disasters in American history include 
the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and the 2008 global financial crisis.137  
These four horsemen of constitutional rot—polarization, loss of trust, economic 
inequality, and policy disaster—mutually reinforce each other.138 Rising economic 
inequality exacerbates polarization, which encourages tribalism and diverts 
energies to symbolic conflicts.139 This makes it easier for politicians supported by 
wealthy donors to sneak through policies that exacerbate economic inequality. 
Increasing inequality and polarization, in turn, generate loss of trust. People no 
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longer trust government because they feel it does not protect their interests, and 
because of increasing polarization they lose trust in their fellow citizens, who they 
believe are stupid, biased, or out to destroy the country. Distrust of government and 
increasing tribalism makes it easier for wealthy donors to manipulate politics and 
influence government officials behind the scenes, enhancing tendencies toward 
oligarchy. Polarization and oligarchy create a government that is unaccountable to 
more and more citizens, which creates even greater distrust and mutual 
recrimination. Polarization and unaccountable government also breed 
overconfidence; they insulate decision makers from necessary criticism, which 
makes policy disasters more likely; policy disasters, in turn, further undermine trust 
in government, and so on. 
One of the most important policy disasters in recent times has been America’s 
inadequate response to the 2008 financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis and its 
aftermath is a special case of the failure of our country’s leaders to come to grips 
with the problem of globalization and how it affects republican government. In the 
face of globalization, American elites—including its wealthiest and best educated 
citizens—have taken pretty good care of themselves. But they have not taken good 
care of the country as a whole.140 
C. The Political Economy of Republican Government 
How does increasing globalization affect the stability of republics? Behind a 
successful republic is a republican political economy. How the economy operates—
and how it distributes its benefits and opportunities—greatly affects how 
representative government operates. If the structure of the economy changes in 
certain ways, or changes too quickly, it can undermine the incentives of public 
officials to pursue the public good and lead to oligarchy or even autocracy. Put 
another way, although Americans often associate capitalism with democracy—and 
free markets with free institutions generally—not every version of capitalism can 
sustain a democratic system of government. 
In particular, stable and effective democracies require a broad-based, stable, and 
economically secure middle class to create the right incentives for government 
officials to pursue the public good and represent the interests of the broad base of 
the citizenry.141 That is because in republics, the people with the most economic 
power and the greatest wealth will usually attempt to leverage their superior 
economic power into political power that will allow them to keep their wealth and 
become even wealthier.142 Therefore, the middle class is a necessary check on the 
ambitions of the wealthy. A big, stable middle class can check the wealthy more 
easily; a small and precarious middle class will find it harder to resist wealth’s 
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political power. This balance of power is by no means perfect, but it prevents a 
slide toward oligarchy and preserves republican government.143 
If economic inequality in a democracy gets too pronounced, the wealthiest will 
tend, over time, to grab disproportionate political power. They will use that power 
to further entrench and enrich themselves, reshaping the content of the laws, their 
interpretation and their enforcement for this purpose. The wealthy can use their 
economic power to lobby for laws that benefit them and help elect executive 
officials who will enforce the laws and issue administrative regulations that favor 
their interests. They can use their wealth to push for the appointment of judges who 
will interpret the laws and the Constitution in a similar direction. They can also 
afford the very best legal counsel to represent their interests before courts and 
administrative agencies. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle: the wealthier you 
are, the more political influence you have and the more political power you can 
exercise, the more you can enrich yourself, and the easier it is to use your increased 
political power and influence to build on previous gains. That is why middle-class 
entitlements like Social Security and Medicare, organizations like labor unions 
(which, in this country, have seriously declined), and progressive systems of 
taxation are important to maintain the republican political economy of modern 
democracies. They support the stability of the middle class and help it check the 
political power of capital. 
We can trace these ideas about republican politics back to the founding, 
although the Framers lived in a very different economic world—one dominated by 
agriculture. Therefore, the mechanisms they would have seen as supporting what 
we now call the middle class would have been very different from those in a post-
industrial economy like our own. At different points in American history, people 
have made the same basic argument about the effects of concentrated wealth on 
republican government, although the economic conditions have been very 
different.144 In the early years of the Republic, for example, Jeffersonian 
Republicans supported the idea of an agrarian republic premised on a broad base of 
self-supporting small farmers.145 They pressed for the exclusion of primogeniture 
and slavery in the Northwest Territory.146 Both slavery and the concentration of 
land ownership in first-born sons would concentrate wealth in a small number of 
people and give them economic leverage to gain ever more economic power. This 
would prevent ordinary Americans from supporting themselves in newly-opening 
western lands. For similar reasons, Jeffersonians were deeply suspicious of 
Federalist support for the financial classes, which, they believed, would concentrate 
wealth, undermine the republic, and produce tendencies toward oligarchy and even 
monarchy.147 
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Half a century later, the anti-slavery Republican Party—named after Jefferson’s 
early Republican Party—developed in opposition to an oligarchical system that 
Republicans called the “Slave Power.”148 These Republicans saw that a small  
group of plantation owners controlled vast amounts of property and land and 
slaves. Slave owners controlled both state governments and the national 
government; they had successfully leveraged their political power into ever greater 
economic power and had packed the Supreme Court with their supporters—the 
most prominent being Chief Justice Roger Taney.149 Republicans feared that the 
Slave Power would succeed in spreading slavery—and slaveholders’ economic 
dominance—throughout the rest of the country.150 
We face the same issues of republican political economy today in the very 
different context of the globalized economy of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries. A globalized economy threatens republican political economy in 
three ways. First, it creates opportunities for rapid increases in income going to the 
very wealthiest individuals, enhancing their comparative political power. Second, it 
puts pressure on social insurance programs and on the economic stability and self-
sufficiency of Americans, weakening their relative political power. Third, it 
empowers the wealthy to push for ever greater upward redistribution through tax 
reform, entitlement reform, and deregulation. 
In the past several decades, the United States has engaged in an enormous shift 
of income and risk from the poor and middle class to the wealthiest Americans.151 
One obvious example is the significant reduction of tax rates from where they stood 
at the end of the New Deal/Civil Rights regime.152 A less well understood but 
equally important example is the shift from defined benefit retirement programs, 
such as employee pensions, to defined contribution programs, such as IRAs and 
401(k)s.153 The former place the risk of economic downturns and bad investment 
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decisions on employers. The latter place the risk on workers saving for their 
retirement. On top of this are a vast number of changes in taxation and regulation 
largely invisible to the general public, but whose cumulative effect is an upward 
redistribution of wealth and power and a downward distribution of risk and danger. 
The long-term result of these changes in political economy has been increasing 
tendencies towards oligarchy. That is true even though our political system remains 
formally democratic and there is intense competition between the two major 
political parties—just as there was, by the way, during the First Gilded Age. 
Despite the fact that we continue to have regular elections, and the two political 
parties are deeply polarized, a relatively small number of backers (small that is, in 
proportion to the mass of the general population) decides who stays in power and 
what kinds of laws and regulations get enacted.154 In such a system, most 
politicians, regardless of their ideological priors, have strong incentives to divert 
resources to the small group of backers who help keep them in power. The result is 
predictable: most of the benefits of economic growth have gone to the wealthiest 
Americans; fiscal and regulatory decisions have diverted a great deal of money that 
might have been used for public services and public goods to wealthy groups and 
individuals.155 Perhaps the most salient recent example of this tendency is the 2017 
tax bill, which is likely to achieve a very significant upward redistribution of 
income from the poor and middle class to the wealthiest Americans.156 
D. Constitutional Rot Produces Demagogues 
Increasing constitutional rot has another troubling effect. It tends to encourage 
the worst kind of politicians: charlatans, snake oil salesmen, and demagogues. 
Constitutional rot causes the public to understand that their government is corrupt, 
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and that their leaders can’t be trusted. And so they turn to other leaders who tell 
them that they have been badly used, and who offer to wash away the corruption. 
Traditionally, demagogues are people who affect a common, rough-hewn, 
folksy, even ill-mannered style, whether or not they are actually from humble 
origins.157 Demagogues identify themselves with the common person. They flatter 
the public,158 telling them that they have been misunderstood; that snobbish elites 
look down on them and are laughing at them; and that the demagogue understands 
how they have been mocked, neglected, and disparaged. 
But demagogues usually do more than this. They also usually employ highly 
emotionally charged rhetoric. This rhetoric divides the public into the noble, wise, 
and honest common people—the real members of the country—and a group of 
immoral and deviant others—elites, foreigners, or minorities—who are not of the 
people and are the real source of the country’s problems.159 Demagogues appeal to 
prejudice and minister to fear.160 Demagogues, in short, look for scapegoats; they 
look for opportunities to divide, frighten, and anger the public, and thereby forge a 
powerful emotional connection with their followers. They use their divisive 
rhetoric—and their emotional connection to their rapt followers—to gain power, 
and to justify violating political norms and the law.161 
Demagogues praise the morality and decency of common people, whom they 
sharply distinguish from those hated others who lack the same morality, decency, 
and genuine connection to the country and its traditions. They denounce the 
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country’s cultural decline. They promise to restore the people to their lost 
greatness. They promise, to borrow a phrase, to make the country great again.162 
Demagogues promise to make everything right, to sweep away the corruption, to 
restore order and decency. Demagogues tell us that they have special abilities, 
special skills that other leaders lack. They have the political will to succeed where 
others have failed. They alone can fix it. 
Very often people are not hoodwinked by demagogues. They see them coming 
from a long way off. They know that these leaders are unscrupulous, that they 
exaggerate, even that they lie. Many people know, in short, that these leaders are 
demagogues. But because of years of constitutional rot, the public has become so 
frustrated—with government, with their current leaders, and even with their fellow 
citizens—that they are willing to take a chance on a demagogue. They are willing 
to roll the dice, to blow everything up, on the chance that the demagogue can clean 
up the mess of politics, on the chance that things can get better.163 
All of which brings me to our current situation. In my view, Donald Trump is a 
symptom of constitutional rot, and not its cause. He has not created our present 
misfortunes. But, like many unscrupulous politicians, he has taken advantage of 
them, and in many ways he is making them worse. 
I won’t mince words. Donald Trump is a demagogue. I don’t know if our 
current President has ever read anything about the history of demagogues, but I do 
know that he likes to hire people who look the part—people who, as they say, come 
straight out of central casting. And I can say with some confidence that Donald 
Trump perfectly fits the role of a demagogue—he looks and acts as if he came 
straight out of central casting. 
Trump, to be sure, is not a man of the common people, but he acts like one; he is 
by turns uncouth, ill-mannered, boorish, corrupt, cunning, and entertaining. He 
offered himself as a sort of “people’s billionaire,” a persona he honed in his years 
as a reality television star. He affects a pose of bluntness, plain-spokenness, and 
honesty, even when he is obviously lying. He blames globalists and elites for 
demeaning and harming ordinary people. He warns against conspiratorial forces 
arrayed against him and the public. He engages in race baiting, he stokes fear of 
immigrants, he raises the specter of crime and loss of social order, and he finds ever 
new ways to divide and anger the public.164  
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Like many demagogues, Trump also is the master of projection and chutzpah. 
He says that he will “drain the swamp”165 and eliminate corruption when he is 
probably the most corrupt person who has run for the Presidency in my lifetime. He 
says that he will stick up for ordinary people who have been humiliated and 
laughed at by elites when he is doing everything he can to benefit the wealthiest 
and line his own pockets.166 He is utterly without shame, a moral and political 
hypocrite who systematically attributes his own failings to others. 
It is almost as if he read a book on how to be a demagogue—“Demagogues for 
Dummies”—and systematically went through each chapter, checking off each 
characteristic move and performing them flawlessly. I cannot say whether he 
studied up on the role or whether he simply has amazing instincts and natural 
talents for demagoguery. In any case, as America descended into ever greater 
depths of constitutional rot, Trump appeared, as if on cue: descending down the 
escalator of his gold-plated skyscraper to take advantage of the people of this 
country, just as he had taken advantage of so many other people before in his 
checkered business career.167 It is as if someone called up Domino’s Pizza and said, 
“I’d like to order a large demagogue to go, with extra cheesiness and bile.” 
Trump’s opponents misunderstand the basis of his appeal. They comfort 
themselves with the belief that he will not be able to keep his con game going 
forever. His administration is a mess, his executive branch is woefully 
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understaffed, his backstabbing underlings leak like sieves, the country is 
perpetually in an uproar, and he lurches daily from scandal to scandal.168 Surely, his 
opponents tell themselves, a President who has been exposed over and over again 
as a fraud, a liar, a cheat, and a scoundrel can’t keep power for long. Surely his 
presidency is going to fall apart at the seams any day now. 
Yet this is how demagogues operate. Demagogues gain and keep power by 
creating and sustaining negative emotions of fear, anxiety, upset, and suspense. 
They thrive on emotional upheaval and a sense of unresolved crisis; they maintain 
power by keeping people worried and uncertain. If you are perpetually upset and 
anxious about American politics, if you distrust and even hate the other half of this 
country, the demagogue’s strategy is working. Polarization binds his followers 
more closely to him and frustrates and paralyzes his opponents. Emotional 
upheaval is the friend of the demagogue. Crisis is his brand. 
Moreover, Trump is no ordinary demagogue. He is a twenty-first century 
innovator, a Michelangelo of political chutzpah. This particular demagogue has 
mastered the arts of the tabloid press and the narrative techniques of reality 
television. He understands that in the early twenty-first century politics can be 
represented and rearranged as a series of episodes in a reality television series, in 
which he is both the producer and the star—an addicting series of episodes in 
which the various participants are shocked, outraged, and wondering whatever will 
happen next. Reality television deals in anger, emotional excess, and a compelling 
narrative of heroes and villains, scandals and blowups, delicious secrets, and 
surprise revelations. Trump has created a new form of political demagoguery that 
corresponds to the rhythm of reality television, one that keeps the media transfixed, 
entertains his supporters, and exhausts his opponents. 
VI. THE BAD NEWS—AND THE GOOD NEWS 
That’s the bad news. Here is the good news. 
This is not the first time that the American political system has faced similar 
challenges. To be sure, it is the first time that all of the cycles I have described have 
lined up in this particular way. But it is not the first time that we have experienced 
the anxiety of an exhausted political regime and a gradual transition to a new one. It 
is not the first time we have experienced a cycle of polarization and depolarization. 
And, above all, it is not the first time that we have been through a cycle of 
constitutional rot and renewal. 
Our current situation most resembles the Gilded Age, or what I would call the 
First Gilded Age, because I believe we are now in America’s Second Gilded Age. 
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As I describe it, you will see some of the parallels, and why I think it is a period 
with many similarities to our own. 
The Gilded Age runs from around the middle of the 1870s to the beginning of 
the twentieth century.169 It is a period of rapid technological progress and enormous 
economic growth.170 It is a period in which a small number of people make huge 
fortunes, and hence it is also a period of increasing inequalities of wealth, which are 
leveraged into political power—and political corruption.171 The new fortunes of the 
Gilded Age generate a great deal of corruption, so much so that government is 
effectively for sale, and people believe that senators and cabinet officials are 
effectively in the pay of the trusts.172  
The Gilded Age is also a period of great waves of immigration from around the 
world, changing people’s ideas about what it means to be an American.173 For the 
same reason, it is also a period of increasing nativism, racism, social unrest, 
violence, and rioting.174 It is the period in which many of the achievements of racial 
equality in the First Reconstruction are eventually blunted and white supremacy is 
resurgent. The beginnings of Jim Crow and black disenfranchisement occur near 
the end of the Gilded Age, symbolized by the Supreme Court’s blessing of Jim 
Crow in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896,175 and its refusal to do anything about black 
disenfranchisement in 1903 in Giles v. Harris.176 It is a period of severe political 
polarization between Democrats, the party of the South, Jim Crow and white 
supremacy, and Republicans, who repeatedly wave the bloody shirt and label the 
Democrats the party of Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion. The Gilded Age is also a 
period of resurgent populism—the People’s Party forms during this period—and it 
is also a period of populist demagogues. 
If you had been living in the First Gilded Age, you might well have looked 
around you—at the increasing economic inequality, the corruption, the influence 
peddling, the effective control of government by the wealthy, the demagoguery, the 
racism, the social unrest, and the violence—and wondered whether American 
democracy could or would survive. 
And yet it did survive. The First Gilded Age gives way to the Progressive Era, a 
period of extensive reforms at local, state, and national levels, four constitutional 
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amendments, and eventually to the New Deal.177 By the first decade of the 
twentieth century, there are progressive wings promoting government reform in 
both major political parties. American democracy bottoms out of its cycle of rot 
and begins a long process of democratic renewal and government reform. There are 
a series of mobilizations for good government, for public health, for workers’ 
rights, for women’s rights—and many far less savory mobilizations too. Political 
polarization eventually declines as well.178  
Of course, things will not happen in exactly the same way they did before. But 
my point is that constitutional rot, like polarization, does not have to get worse and 
worse. I not only believe that we can bottom out from a period of constitutional rot 
and experience a period of constitutional renewal, I know that it has happened 
before. Just as the First Gilded Age gave way to a Progressive Era, it is possible for 
this, our Second Gilded Age, to give way to a Second Progressive Era, a period of 
reform and renewal addressing the urgent problems of our own time.  
Our politics is the result of a series of overlapping cycles, which together have 
produced our political world. From this larger perspective, the emergence of a 
successful demagogue like Trump is a genuine problem for American democracy; 
yet it is merely a symptom of a much larger set of problems that festered long 
before he ran for President. Trump was only able to rise to power because the 
Reagan coalition is aging and falling apart, because his party’s political strategies 
have contributed to increasing polarization and distrust among fellow citizens, and 
because the regime’s commitments to policies that produce economic inequality 
have contributed to increasing constitutional rot. To be sure, President Trump is 
doing his best to exacerbate both the polarization and the rot. But even if tomorrow 
President Trump resigned from office, or was impeached and removed, and 
replaced by his Vice President—a solid son of Indiana—the new President and the 
party he leads would face the same problems. 
The Reagan regime is crumbling. It will eventually fall away, replaced by a new 
regime, probably in five to ten years. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the 
Democrats will be the dominant party in this new regime. According to this 
possible future, this regime will feature a new dominant coalition that will build on 
and further develop Barack Obama’s 2008 and 2012 “coalition of the ascendant.” 
Although insufficient in 2016—and perhaps even in 2020—that emerging coalition 
of voters will grow comparatively stronger, as parts of the older Reagan coalition 
age and die, as newer, younger voters emerge to replace them, and as educated 
professionals, women, and other whites defect to the Democratic Party. It is also 
possible that a third party will emerge, like the Republicans in the 1850s, to 
become the dominant party; but this is more difficult to achieve in the twenty-first 
century than it was in the nineteenth, and the Democrats, unlike the Whigs in the 
1850s, do not seem ripe for dissolution. 
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The other possibility is that the Republican Party—or perhaps a breakaway 
faction of the party—will reform itself, regroup, form a national majority, and 
extend the Reagan regime. Such a party would probably be different in important 
respects from Reagan’s party, with a different coalition and a different set of 
agendas and concerns. There is a historical precedent for this too. In the 1890s it 
looked as if the Democratic Party, allied with a populist insurgency, might make a 
breakthrough. But Democrats had the misfortune to control the White House during 
the panic of 1894.179 William McKinley defeated William Jennings Bryan in the 
1896 election, reorganizing the Republican Party and American politics around a 
new set of issues.180 The reinvigorated Republican Party then continued to 
dominate American politics until the New Deal. 
This scenario is the strongest argument for seeing Trump as an affiliated rather 
than as a disjunctive President. He would play the same structural role as 
McKinley, providing a necessary course correction to keep Republicans dominant 
for a generation or more.  
I don’t see Trump as the new McKinley, for two reasons. First, reviving the 
Republican regime in our current political chaos would require great vision and 
strategic acumen. Although Trump has proven himself to be a great tactician, he 
seems too undisciplined, too driven by impulse and personal gain to effect such a 
transformation. Second, the most likely reformation of Republicanism—as a 
nativist, populist party organized around the South and rural America—will more 
resemble Bryan’s 1896 populist coalition than McKinley’s reformed coalition of 
businesses, city workers, and African-Americans. It is not clear that one can cobble 
a durable majority out of the segments of the American public that are growing 
older and losing population. To be sure, Trump has defied predictions and 
expectations many times before. Even so, Trump seems to represent a dead end for 
the party—the last President in the Reagan regime rather than the founder of an 
American conservative revival. 
Whatever happens, the agendas of politics ten years in the future are likely to 
look very different from the politics that we are suffering through now. That is the 
message with which I will leave you: constitutional development doesn’t move in 
straight lines. It goes in cycles. And there are multiple cycles at work. There is a 
cycle of constitutional rot and renewal. There is a cycle of polarization and 
depolarization. And there is the cycle of the rise and fall of political regimes. 
When all of these cycles line up in a particularly unhappy way, the country 
moves into political darkness, an eclipse of democracy. But just like the eclipse on 
August 21, 2017, the darkness does not last forever. In fact, it lasts only a few 
minutes in the larger scheme of things. You may not see that now, but I promise 
you, this eclipse is purely temporary. 
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